SECOND
DIVISION
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus -
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
Promulgated:
SENTINEL WATCHMAN &
PROTECTIVE AGENCY, INC.,
Respondent.
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner
Salvador Bunagan seeks a review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54258-59. The Court of Appeals ruled on the
consolidated petitions filed by petitioner and respondent Sentinel Watchman
& Protective Agency, Inc. assailing the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) on the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
petitioner against respondent.
Petitioner
was employed by respondent as security guard and was assigned to one of its
clients, La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory (La Suerte).
In
May 1994, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Lt.
Maravillas, Security Manager of La Suerte. Lt. Maravillas thus requested respondent to replace petitioner.
On
Petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and money claims against respondent and La Suerte. He claimed,
among others, that there was no valid or just cause for his dismissal and that
he was not accorded due process before his services were terminated.
Respondent, on the other hand,
asserted that petitioner was not dismissed from his employment on
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
petitioner. He held that petitioner was
dismissed without just or authorized cause and due process when he was not
allowed to report for duty on
Respondent appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC, in its resolution dated
Entry of judgment was made on
On
In its Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, to read as
follows:
Dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of certain monetary
benefits, for lack of legal basis;
Ordering
respondent to reinstate complainant to his position as security guard without backwages, as discussed above; and
In
lieu of reinstatement if the complainant refuse[s], ordering respondent to pay
complainant separation pay computed at one month salary for every year of service,
a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one whole year.
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner and respondent filed
separate petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court assailing the decision
of the NLRC. Petitioner averred that the
NLRC erred in reopening the case despite the entry of judgment, hence,
finality, of the resolution dismissing the appeal. Respondent, on the other
hand, questioned the award of separation pay to petitioner in case he refuses
to be reinstated. The two petitions were
consolidated and later remanded to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.[7]
Granting the petition of herein
respondent, the Court of Appeals ruled that Bunagan
was not entitled to separation pay. It
stated that separation pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement only when
recall can no longer be effected as when the position
he previously held no longer exists or when there is strained relations
resulting from loss of trust and confidence.
As neither of these conditions applied in the case at bar, there was no
ground to grant separation pay to petitioner in case he declines
reinstatement. With respect to Bunagan’s
petition, the Court of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals disposed of the case,
thus:
WHEREFORE,
the petition filed by petitioner Salvador Bunagan in
CA-G.R. SP No. 54258 is DENIED for paucity of merit.
The
petition of petitioner Sentinel Watchman & Protective Agency in CA-G.R. SP
No. 54259 is GRANTED and the directive of respondent NLRC in the challenged
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner filed the instant petition
for review arguing that the Court of Appeals and the NLRC erred:
1. in not considering the Resolution
dismissing the appeal of Sentinel -- with the issuance and release of Entry of
Judgment – for having been filed out of time, final and nothing more could be
done as the NLRC thereafter had lost jurisdiction over the case; and
2. in holding
that the petitioner merely relied upon his submission that there was already an
Entry of Judgment and did not argue anymore on the merits of the case, which
failure of petitioner was even made point against him.[9]
We rule for
the petitioner.
We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the entry of judgment made on
The NLRC initially dismissed
respondent’s appeal for being late. It
is undisputed that respondent received a copy of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on
Under the law, an appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter is perfected upon filing of a memorandum of
appeal and payment of the appeal fee within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the questioned decision, award or order of the Labor Arbiter. In case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, the appellant is also required to post a cash or surety bond in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.[10] The Rules of Procedure of the NLRC prohibits
the filing of a motion for extension of time to perfect the appeal, and the
filing of a notice of appeal without the memorandum of appeal will not stall
the running of the period to appeal.[11] The Old Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which
was applicable at the time provides:
Section 1. Periods of Appeal. – Decisions, awards or orders of the
Labor Abiter and the POEA Administrator shall be final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by
any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter or the Administrator x x x x
Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. – (a) The appeal shall
be filed within the reglementary period as provided
in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be
under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of
a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the
appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service
on the other party of such appeal.
A
mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for
perfecting an appeal.
x x x
Section 7. No
Extension of Period. – No motion or request for extension of the period within
which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.
It is clear, therefore, that the
appeal filed by petitioner was dismissible. Respondent did not even cite in its
motion for reconsideration any justifiable excuse for the belated filing of the
memorandum of appeal.[12] Well-settled is the principle that the
perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary
period is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders
the questioned decision final and executory and
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much
less to entertain the appeal. The
underlying purpose of this principle is to prevent needless delay, a
circumstance which would allow the employer to wear out the efforts and meager
resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to settle
for less than what is due him.[13] This
Court has declared that although the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules
of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the interpretation of the rules in
deciding labor cases, such liberality should not be applied where it would
render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is
adopted. The liberal interpretation
stems from the mandate that the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial
and paramount consideration.[14] We see no reason in this case to waive the
rules on the perfection of appeal.
Moreover, under Article 223 of the
Labor Code, an appeal from the decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter
may be entertained only on the following grounds:
a. If there is prima facie evidence of
abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
b. If the decision, order or award was
secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;
c. If made purely on questions of law; and
d. If serious errors in the findings of
facts are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
A
reading of the decision of the Labor Arbiter shows that none of these
conditions exists in the case at bar. It
does not appear that the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was
illegally dismissed, as well as the reliefs granted
to him, was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The facts reveal that sometime in May 1994,
petitioner had a dispute with the Security Manager of La Suerte,
prompting the latter to request the respondent for his replacement. Prior to his formal relief on
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 35-43.
[2] Rollo, pp. 44-46.
[3] Rollo, p. 48.
[4] Rollo, pp. 49-51.
[5] Rollo, pp. 53-61.
[6] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[7] G.R. No. 130886,
[8] Rollo,
p. 31.
[9] Rollo, p. 15.
[10] Art. 223, Labor Code.
[11] Section 3, Rule VI, Old Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; Section 1, Rule VI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
[12] Rollo, pp. 49-51.
[13] Kathy-O
Enterprises v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117610,
[14]
[15]